UA Codes and Judicial Committee

Minutes
Codes and Judicial Committee, University Assembly
Friday, November 15, 2013
305 Day Hall

Attendance of voting members:
Present: C. Ferguson, C. Gelderloos, F. Langrais, G. Mezey, B. Thompson, R. Wayne, K. Zoner

Absent: L. Liu, M. Lukasiewicz

G. Mezey called the meeting to order at 3:33 p.m.

G. Mezey noted that today’s meeting would primarily be an introduction to the issues at hand and the documents distributed. He reminded the members that the committee would not investigate the Ho Plaza incident. Instead, the committee will work to decide if there is a need to change or clarify the code. Whether or not the UUP deserves a place in the code will also be considered. G. Mezey outlined three general options for dealing with the UUP.

C. Ferguson asked about the status of R. 9. G. Mezey clarified that the resolution is considered dead in the assembly.

C. Gelderloos noted that members were provided two reports spawned by the Ho Plaza incident and inquired whether one was more authoritative than the other. G. Mezey responded that neither was more authoritative. C. Gelderloos stated that it seemed the university might be inclined to back up its police in a report. G. Mezey told the members that consideration of this possible bias is a personal choice for each member to make.

G. Mezey then introduced the resolution that was sent to the assembly in the previous academic year. He intended to point out the places in the resolution where most contention was centered so that the committee might deal with these selections first.

C. Ferguson questioned the decision of using the failed resolution as a starting point for this year’s discussions. He offered the charge to the CJC to reconsider written by D. Bunck as an alternative starting place. G. Mezey responded that the committee should use the resolution’s structure with the understanding that any amount of the document can be changed as needed.

G. Mezey provided a brief explanation of the resolution. He stated that a major point of contention was the phrase suggesting the use of the UUP as a means of notifying the university so that officials are able to protect public safety and meet other concerns inherent in any sizeable event even when notification is not strictly required. G. Mezey made a cursory suggestion to remove this sentence from the resolution. Discussion of this resolution was tabled.

Next, the committee considered R. 10, returned by President Skorton.

M. B. Grant explained the president’s response and gave the perspective of the Office of the Judicial Administrator on the subject of appeals of summary decision agreements. She noted that only one part of the resolution was sent back for reconsideration. Skorton had concerns about the section that denies institutional complainants the right to appeal summary decision agreements. This portion of the resolution was meant to codify a long-standing interpretation of ambiguous terms, but the president and administrators worried that the resolution might constitute the forfeiture of an institutional right. M. B. Grant recognized this as a fair question while adding that the wording in the resolution prevents an influx of administrative work. Should institutional complainant be afforded the right to appeal summary decision agreements, the office would have to notify each such complainant of this right. Finally, she offered that perhaps some particular types of cases with institutional complainants could be predefined as covered with the same complainant rights as an individual complainant.

R. Wayne noted that he felt the Judicial Administrator represented the university. He asked M. B. Grant if she talks with people other than the accused when forming a summary decision.

M. B. Grant responded that she will find out from the complainant what they feel is an acceptable outcome to avoid a surprise. She also stated that it is inaccurate to consider the JA office a representative of the university because it has dismissed cases brought by the university many times due to insufficient evidence or other issues.

C. Ferguson noted the difficulty in defining an institutional complainant. For example, it seemed that student groups should be afforded the right to appeal. However, in the case of the CUPD, the situation is murkier. Allowing appeal in this case is akin to a violation of double jeopardy protection.

M. B. Grant noted that, while a difficulty definitely exists here, the same argument could be made in the case of individual complainants.

B. Thompson noted that the policies in place now have been the same for a long time. He wondered how many additional appeals would realistically come in, considering the current system has been working for so long. M. B. Grant agreed that the number of additional institutional complaints would probably be significantly less than individual complaints, though she added that the office currently gets many low level complaints from some departments which the office needs to address.

C. Ferguson asked how this system would work for bias related incidents. He wondered who the institution would be in such a case. M. B. Grant started by explaining that the police do not consider themselves to be a complainant. She recognized that even for cases involving the police there may be, in practical terms, an institutional complainant and that it remains unclear how such a complainant would be generally defined.

C. Ferguson followed up with another hypothetical situation, this time involving an incident in a residence hall. M. B. Grant again stated that an institutional representative or complainant is not clearly defined, though it would possibly be an appropriate high-level administrator. She guessed that, although in such situations a whole community is possibly affected, a single spokesperson would be selected on behalf of the university.

G. Mezey clarified that the original goal of the language under reconsideration was to reduce the administrative burden on the Office of the Judicial Administrator so that they are able to more promptly look after the rights of individuals.

M. B. Grant echoed these sentiments from her perspective, stating that employees would be spending time distributing notices of appeal rights without any real likelihood that significantly more appeals would be generated. However, she also noted that she was worried about ignoring the president’s concerns in their entirety. She suggested asking the president where his priorities are here.

K. Zoner stated that she could not think of a time when there is not an individual person who is the aggrieved party.

G. Mezey interjected that he is uncomfortable with the use of specific hypothetical situations for the purpose of guiding the discussion or rewriting the resolution. He also worried that asking the president to identify specific types of cases would be similarly limiting. Likely, this would result in finished language that could later cause confusion or have questionable intent.

M. B. Grant left the meeting.

R. Wayne noted that there is a greater case for not giving the right to the institution.

C. Ferguson stated that it is not the job of the committee to judge the workload of outside offices.

G. Mezey stated that it is important for the committee to consider how its decisions will affect other members of the community. In some cases, the committee may make the decision that some task is a key function and must be preserved, despite the workload added to an office’s duties, but other times consideration for long term employees and long standing systems supersede any improvements brought about by a proposed change. He finished by saying that, armed with the thoughts from today and an understanding of the documents distributed, more decisions will be made at the next meeting.

G. Mezey adjourned the meeting at 4:40 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Noah Wegener
Assemblies Clerk